earthlink.net: mail servers, SPF, DMARC, DKIM and reputation
Everything Spaw reads about earthlink.net, on one page: a free mailbox provider, checked from live DNS, the open disposable, role and free-provider lists, the registry's RDAP record and the threat blocklists, and cached for a week.
Mail servers
- Accepts mail
- yes
- MX status
- accepts_mail
- MX hosts
- mx04.earthlink-vadesecure.net, mx01.earthlink-vadesecure.net, mx02.earthlink-vadesecure.net, mx03.earthlink-vadesecure.net
- Provider
- other
- Provider type
- other
- Mail hosts on a threat blocklist
- no
- Mail host network
- hosting
- Known catch-all
- not evaluated
SPF and DMARC
- SPF published
- yes
- SPF record
- v=spf1 mx a ip4:208.89.14.209/32 ip4:208.89.13.209/32 ip4:208.89.14.202/32 ip4:24.41.67.0/24 ip4:15.204.141.63/32 ip4:15.204.141.62/32 ip4:51.81.221.83/32 ip4:51.81.221.17/32 include:spf.earthlink-vadesecure.net -all
- SPF all-qualifier
- -all
- SPF DNS lookups
- 3
- DMARC policy
- none
- DMARC record
- v=DMARC1; p=none; adkim=r; aspf=r; pct=100;
- DMARC pct
- 100
- DMARC reports collected
- no
DKIM, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT and BIMI
- DKIM selectors found
- none of the common selectors
- MTA-STS
- no
- TLS-RPT
- no
- BIMI
- no
Registration
- Registered
- —
- Age
- —
- Expires
- —
- Last changed
- —
- Registrar
- —
- Registrant withheld
- not evaluated
What kind of domain
- Category
- webmail
- Free mailbox provider
- yes
- Disposable
- no
- Relay service
- no
- Parked
- no
Mail servers for earthlink.net
earthlink.net publishes 4 MX records. Senders deliver to the lowest-priority host first, mx04.earthlink-vadesecure.net, and fall back down the list if it does not answer.
Who runs the mail
The hosts match the pattern of an unrecognised provider. The mail hosts do not match a known provider pattern, so the domain is probably self-hosted or on a smaller provider. Catch-all behaviour varies from server to server, which is exactly why a mailbox-level probe, not the MX record, decides whether an address exists.
What this means for verification
An address at earthlink.net passes the free checks (syntax, MX, lists), so the API goes on to the mailbox-level SMTP handshake, which ends before any message is sent. The result is deliverable, risky, or undeliverable with a reason field that names the evidence.
SPF for earthlink.net
earthlink.net publishes an SPF record; it authorises 1 included sender list, and the record ends in -all (hard fail): mail from a server that is not listed should be rejected.
DMARC for earthlink.net
The DMARC policy for earthlink.net is p=none: the domain collects authentication reports but asks receivers not to act on failures. Spoofed mail is still delivered; the owner just gets told about it.
Why it matters
SPF says which servers may send as earthlink.net; DKIM signs the messages; DMARC tells receivers what to do when neither checks out and reports back to the owner. Together they decide whether mail from earthlink.net is trusted, and whether someone else can pretend to be earthlink.net. For verification they are a domain-quality signal: Spaw folds a missing SPF record into the risk score and reports has_spf and dmarc_policy on every email and domain lookup.
DKIM keys for earthlink.net
None of the common selectors publishes a key for earthlink.net. That does not mean earthlink.net signs nothing: a selector can be any label, and a domain that signs with one of its own (s2024, k2, mail-eu) is invisible to a list of common names. Only a DMARC report, or the DKIM-Signature header on a real message, names the selector for certain.
What the check reads
DKIM keys live in DNS at <selector>._domainkey.earthlink.net, one TXT record per selector, and the selector is chosen by whoever signs the mail. This checker asks for the selectors the large providers and sending platforms use by default (google, selector1 and selector2 for Microsoft 365, k1, s1, fm1 and about thirty more), so a key found here is a real key, and a key not found here may simply sit under a name the list does not know.
How it fits with SPF and DMARC
The DMARC policy for earthlink.net is p=none: the domain collects authentication reports but asks receivers not to act on failures. Spoofed mail is still delivered; the owner just gets told about it. earthlink.net publishes an SPF record; it authorises 1 included sender list, and the record ends in -all (hard fail): mail from a server that is not listed should be rejected.
Transport security for earthlink.net
earthlink.net publishes no an MTA-STS policy record record at _mta-sts.earthlink.net. Without MTA-STS, a sender that cannot negotiate TLS with the mail host may fall back to delivering in the clear, and an attacker on the path can force exactly that. earthlink.net publishes no a TLS-RPT record record at _smtp._tls.earthlink.net. TLS-RPT would give the domain owner a daily report of delivery attempts that could not establish TLS; without it, failures are invisible.
Brand indicators for earthlink.net
earthlink.net publishes no a BIMI record record at default._bimi.earthlink.net. BIMI is optional and mostly cosmetic; it only becomes possible once DMARC enforces quarantine or reject.
SPF details for earthlink.net
earthlink.net publishes SPF. The policy's all qualifier is -all (hard fail: unlisted servers are rejected). Evaluating it takes 3 DNS lookups, within the ten RFC 7208 allows.
DMARC details for earthlink.net
The DMARC policy for earthlink.net is p=none: the domain collects authentication reports but asks receivers not to act on failures. Spoofed mail is still delivered; the owner just gets told about it. The policy applies to all of the domain's mail (pct=100). No aggregate-report address is published (no rua=), so the owner learns nothing from receivers about who sends as the domain.
Is earthlink.net disposable?
earthlink.net is a free consumer mailbox provider, the kind used for personal accounts. Addresses there are legitimate, but they say nothing about the person's company.
About the domain
Its mail is handled by an unrecognised provider.
How Spaw treats addresses at earthlink.net
An address at earthlink.net passes the free checks (syntax, MX, lists), so the API goes on to the mailbox-level SMTP handshake, which ends before any message is sent. The result is deliverable, risky, or undeliverable with a reason field that names the evidence.
Common questions about earthlink.net
- Does earthlink.net accept mail?
- earthlink.net accepts mail through a third-party mail host.
- Does earthlink.net publish SPF and DMARC?
- earthlink.net publishes SPF ending in -all and a DMARC policy of none.
- Is earthlink.net a disposable, relay or free-provider domain?
- earthlink.net is a free mailbox provider, so an address there is a consumer inbox rather than a company's.
- Does earthlink.net publish DKIM, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT or BIMI?
- earthlink.net does not publish MTA-STS, does not publish TLS-RPT and does not publish BIMI. None of the common DKIM selectors publishes a key, which does not mean the domain signs nothing: a selector outside the common list is invisible to this check.
- Where does this report come from?
- Live DNS, the open disposable, role and free-provider lists, the registry's RDAP record and the threat blocklists the IP product installs, read on 2026-10-08 and cached for a week. Nothing here says anything about a person; it describes the domain's mail setup on that day.
Check another domain
checked 2026-10-08 · sources: live-dns@2026-10-12 · disposable-domains@2026-10-05 · free-provider-domains@2026-10-05 · mx-provider-patterns@2026-10-08 · forwarding-services@2026-10-08 · domain-categories@2026-09-12 · parking-nameservers@2026-09-12 · threat-blocklists@2026-10-11 · mail-policies@2026-09-12
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